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What Happens When Three Buyers Want Three Different Products?

Two colleagues in a modern office environment brainstorming and planning business strategies.

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The Friday I Stopped the Launch was the first time I trusted a pattern over my own roadmap. Three customer calls, back to back, each one a green light on the product we had spent two months shipping. And each buyer was hiring it for a completely different job. One wanted to replace a manual reconciliation process. One wanted a demo piece for an investor meeting. One wanted a way to justify headcount to a skeptical board. Same software, three different products.

The call that broke the pattern

The second call is the one I keep coming back to. A founder in Lagos, building in fintech, told me he loved the workflow we had built. Then he described using it in a way we had never designed for, something closer to a reporting layer for his investors than a tool for his own operations. I almost corrected him. Instead I asked what he would pay for. His answer was double our price. The third call, an hour later, was the mirror image. A founder in Berlin wanted the same tool, but as an internal guardrail to stop his team from shipping half-finished features.

Two buyers, two different jobs, one product. I stood up from my desk and looked at the release candidate. It was done. Tests passed. The docs were written. I told the team we were holding it.

Three markets, three jobs

The uncomfortable part was that none of the three buyers was wrong. A product can genuinely serve three jobs. The problem was that we had built for one. Our positioning, our onboarding, our demo script, they all assumed a single primary use case. Every buyer would have onboarded, hit the mismatch in week two, and churned. The feature work to serve all three was months of effort we did not have.

This is the moment where the founder instinct says ship and iterate. The evidence said the opposite. Three buyers in a row, each describing a different job, is not noise. In pre-seed and seed stage, when you have maybe a dozen real conversations, three of them agreeing on nothing except that they want the product is a signal. The risk was not the delay. The risk was shipping a product that made sense to no one because it tried to be everything.

When a good product is the wrong lesson

There is a documented version of this pattern from an industry that had every incentive to get it right. In the late 2000s, the team building the first iPhone apps at a company later acquired by a major tech firm had a product that worked exactly as designed. The problem was that their users kept describing it as something else. The team's postmortem, covered in the tech press at the time, framed the failure not as a bug or a missed feature, but as a discovery failure: they had built the thing they said they would build, and ignored what their users said they were hiring it to do. The product was good. It was just good for a job nobody had.

The lesson was not that iteration is bad. It was that a product can be finished and still be undiscovered, because the market was trying to tell you something in the first month that you only heard after the launch.

We spent the next two weeks doing what the calls told us to do. We picked one job, the one that paid, and rebuilt the positioning around it. The other two buyers we wrote to personally, explained what we had found, and pointed them to alternatives. One of them came back six months later, on the same terms he had originally offered. The release we eventually shipped looked different from the release candidate we paused. It was smaller, and it was clearer.

The call you have to make yourself

Pausing a launch is not a product decision. It is a founder decision. The team can tell you the tests pass. The investors can tell you the date matters. Only you can tell whether the market has told you something that overrides both. I have made the mistake of shipping on schedule into a mismatch, and I have made the mistake of pausing without evidence. The Friday I stopped the launch was the first time I had enough evidence to make the pause feel obvious instead of cowardly.

The question is not whether your product works. The question is whether your buyers are describing the same job. If they are not, you have not finished the product. You have finished a prototype of three different products, and you have not chosen which one to build. Choosing is the work.

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