A credible overseas contract should wait until you complete the three discovery calls that determine whether your core product deserves another quarter. Take the contract only if you can protect those calls, document what you learn, and keep the contract from quietly becoming your product strategy.
The evidence you are about to lose
In April 1970, Apollo 13 lost an oxygen tank after launch. The lunar landing was abandoned. The immediate problem became getting James Lovell, Jack Swigert, and Fred Haise home alive.
The lunar module had supplies designed for two astronauts. It now had to support three. Carbon dioxide levels were a serious concern, and the command module’s square lithium hydroxide canisters did not fit the lunar module’s round receptacles. Engineers in Houston developed an adapter from materials already available on board. The crew built it, and Apollo 13 returned safely.
NASA’s Apollo 13 mission history records the incident because the team worked from the constraint they actually had, with limited time and limited materials. They did not solve every problem at once. They dealt with the condition that could end the mission.
Three customer calls can look small beside a signed overseas contract. They are small only if the answers cannot change your next quarter. If those calls can tell you whether buyers have a recurring problem, what they will pay for, or where your product fails in real work, they are the canisters on the table.
Revenue can become a roadmap by accident
A contract can bring relief. It can cover salaries, make an investor update easier to write, and give a small team room to breathe. Those are real reasons to take one.
It can also consume the person who holds the product context. A customer asks for a reporting workflow. Then they need an integration. Then their approval process shapes the next sprint. A short engagement stretches because the money is welcome and the requests are reasonable one by one.
Soon, the roadmap reflects the buyer who arrived first rather than the market you meant to understand.
I have seen this tension show up differently across Accra, Berlin, and the US. The contract may be overseas, paid in a more stable currency, and attached to a company with a recognizable name. The discovery calls may be local, awkward to schedule, and still too early to produce revenue. That contrast can make the choice feel obvious before the evidence is in.
It rarely is.
A contract that buys time is useful. A contract that replaces learning is expensive, even when the invoice is paid. The distinction needs to be made before anyone starts promising delivery dates.
Put boundaries around both decisions
Treat the contract and the discovery work as two separate decisions.
First, decide what the three calls must answer. Avoid broad conversations about whether people “like” the product. Ask about the last time the problem happened, what the person did instead, who approved the spend, and what would have to change before they paid. If the same problem appears across the calls, you have a reason to keep testing. If each conversation reveals a different problem, that matters too.
Then decide whether the contract has a boundary you can defend. A fixed scope, a named owner, and time on the calendar for customer work are more valuable than a vague assurance that the product can continue “alongside” client delivery.
If you cannot name the hours protected for discovery, the contract will take them.
This is close to the problem in Daniel’s European contract. His product roadmap was at risk.. The risk is rarely one dramatic decision. It is the accumulation of sensible requests that leave no room to find out what the product should become.
Use the calls to set a real trigger
Before accepting the work, write down the result that would change your mind. For example: if two of the three prospects describe the same urgent workflow and agree to a follow-up where pricing is discussed, protect another quarter for the core product. If none can describe a costly current workaround or involve a buyer, narrow the product or pause it.
This makes the calls accountable. You are not choosing vague hope over revenue. You are buying a short window to reduce a decision that could otherwise cost months.
Apollo 13’s crew could not wait for perfect information. The engineers in Houston still had to use the evidence available and build for the constraint in front of them. Your version is less dramatic, but the discipline is similar. Ring-fence the three calls. Decide what counts as evidence. Then let that evidence, rather than the relief of a new contract, determine the next quarter.
Comments
No comments yet.