An investor’s network is useful only where it reaches the people who can change the company’s immediate position. A founder selling in Accra should judge an introduction by its path to a qualified buyer in Accra, even when the investor has impressive relationships in London and Berlin.
By 2012, Tesco had spent years trying to make Fresh & Easy work in the United States. The British retailer had entered the market in 2007 under Tim Mason, placing stores across California, Arizona and Nevada. Tesco understood supermarkets, supply chains and private-label products. It had capital, experienced operators and a strong position at home.
The US business still failed to find enough customers.
That gap matters because Tesco did not arrive without knowledge or reach. It arrived with knowledge and reach built somewhere else.
A strong network can still end at the wrong border
Tesco’s British record made its US expansion plausible. The company had reason to believe that its retail experience would travel. Fresh & Easy stores were smaller than a typical American supermarket, carried prepared meals and relied on operating choices Tesco knew well from Britain.
American buying habits did not bend around that experience.
Contemporary reporting focused on several possible causes, including store format, locations, product choices and the economic conditions surrounding the launch. Reuters documented Tesco’s decision to leave the United States in 2013 after the company concluded that Fresh & Easy would not deliver an acceptable return.
The useful point is narrower than a complete postmortem. Tesco possessed real capability, but capability developed in one market did not automatically create demand in another.
A founder in Accra can face the same mismatch on a smaller balance sheet.
The investor may know venture partners in London, product leaders in Berlin and founders who can take a meeting in New York. Those contacts can help with fundraising, hiring and market intelligence. None of them necessarily knows the procurement lead, distributor, operations manager or business owner who can approve a Ghanaian contract this quarter.
The investor has a network. The company has a buyer problem.
Count the path to revenue, not the prestige of the introduction
On Friday afternoon, the founder’s question should become practical: who can this person introduce me to before the next payroll decision?
That question changes how an introduction is valued. A senior title carries less weight when the person has no budget, no urgent problem and no authority over the purchase. A less glamorous introduction may matter more if it reaches the person currently paying staff to handle the process your product can automate.
This distinction becomes sharper when runway is short. A founder with twelve months can explore a European partnership that may mature later. A founder protecting the next few months needs to separate strategic access from commercial access.
I would map every promised introduction against four facts:
- Which company can this person reach?
- Is that company inside the market we are selling to now?
- Can the contact approve a purchase or bring in the person who can?
- What specific problem gives them a reason to speak this month?
If those answers remain vague, I would record the introduction as possible future access. I would not count it in the revenue plan.
The same discipline applies when a warm introduction looks qualified but is not. In Kojo’s unqualified introduction, the risk comes from treating proximity to a decision as though it were authority to make one. The calendar fills. The pipeline does not move.
Market access must be tested like product demand
Founders often diligence an investor’s cheque, reputation and portfolio. They should also diligence the geography and function of the investor’s relationships.
Ask for examples. Which customers has the investor helped a portfolio company reach in Ghana, Nigeria or South Africa? Which introductions produced a pilot, contract or clear rejection? Does the investor know buyers, or mainly other investors and founders?
There is no insult in discovering that the answer is London and Berlin. That network may become valuable when the company expands, raises abroad or hires there. The mistake is assigning it a job it cannot currently perform.
This is a Jobs to Be Done question applied to capital. One investor may help close the next round. Another may help recruit an engineer. A third may open the door to the Accra buyer whose contract keeps the team alive. The founder needs to know which job is urgent before deciding which network is strong.
Product testing already works this way. A checkout that succeeds in one market has not proved that customers elsewhere can complete it, as a failed Accra checkout showed. Distribution deserves the same treatment. Test the route with a real buyer before treating geographic reach as established.
Put local revenue beside international optionality
Tesco eventually exited the United States. Its experience elsewhere did not disappear, but it could not make Fresh & Easy commercially sound in that market.
A Ghanaian startup rarely has Tesco’s room to absorb that lesson.
Before the next investor meeting, divide the introduction list into two columns. Put buyers who can affect revenue during the current runway in the first. Put funders, partners and future-market contacts in the second. Both columns have value. Only one keeps the company alive in Accra today.
Then ask for one introduction from the first column, with a named company, a relevant buyer and a reason for the conversation. That request reveals more about an investor’s usable reach than another hour discussing the size of their network.
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